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Humans flexibly weight incoming evidencewhen updating beliefs and adjusting behavior. In the current issue
ofNeuron, McGuire et al. (2014) show how distinct neuronal correlates of main factors underlying this weight-
ing converge on a common mechanism driving belief updates.An essential question when evaluating ev-
idence for one’s beliefs in a changing
world is whether or not new information
that diverges from expectation is indica-
tive of an underlying change or just reflects
expectable variations. Distinguishing
change from noise is necessary as it may
require adjustments of behavior in many
contexts, for example when deciding
whether a person with subfebrile body
temperature should be quarantined for a
suspected highly contagious infection
with poor prognosis, when determining
whether extreme air and water tempera-
tures indicate global warming, or when
evaluating whether unexpected empirical
findings result from noisy measurement
methods or require a revision of the tested
hypothesis.
The degree to which the deviation of an
event from expectancy influences the up-
dating of beliefs about the environment
can be considered a learning rate. By
varying the impact of an observation in
an environment in which sudden change
may occur, it is possible to drastically
reduce trial and error learning costs (Cour-
ville et al., 2006). However, it has been a
long-standing debate as to which factors
may drive learning to become faster or
slower.
McGuire et al. (2014) designed a task to
directly measure learning rates by dividing
belief updates by the visual prediction
error—that is, the difference between
expected and experienced outcome.
Notably, in contrast to many previous
studies, belief updates were directly re-
flected in quantifiable behavioral adjust-
ments. In this task, while fMRI was
recorded, subjects had to infer the position662 Neuron 84, November 19, 2014 ª2014 Eof a helicopter hidden in a cloudy sky. The
goal was to catch bags being dropped
from the helicopter by placing a virtual
bucket underneath it. Some noise (e.g.,
reflecting turbulences) was added to the
bags’ falling trajectory. Thus, each out-
come in itself deviated more or less from
the expected position of the helicopter,
but someespeciallyunexpectedoutcomes
may have indicated that the helicopter has
moved to a novel position. Such major
shifts required the update of the partici-
pant’s belief of the helicopter’s position
and an according shift of the bucket.
Bags randomly contained gold (reward) or
stones (no reward). Employing compu-
tational modeling, the authors derived
two normative factors from a Bayesian
model that they identified as having
major influences on learning rates. Figure 1
summarizes the main findings schema-
tically by depicting the model-based
and incidental influences on the learning
rate, their neuronal correlates, and their
convergence.
The first normative factor is the proba-
bility of the occurrence of a change point
(CP; an actual change in helicopter’s posi-
tion), which is positively dependent on the
general likelihood of changes (prior or
accumulated knowledge about the vola-
tility of the environment) and increases
when an outcome is particularly unpre-
dicted or surprising under the current
belief. In general, change may be certain,
for example when encountering a new sit-
uation, or very low in a familiar, stable
setting (O’Reilly 2013). Importantly,
converging lines of evidence indicate
that the relationship between updating
and surprise is nonlinear: updating of alsevier Inc.belief is associated with distinct phenom-
ena both behaviorally and neuronally over
and above the increased surprise associ-
ated with it (O’Reilly et al., 2013). In the
current study, brain activity that could be
uniquely attributed to this factor was
mainly seen in occipital visual areas even
when controlling for eye movements that
are associated with especially unex-
pected outcomes. A prominent theory
holds that within the neural code the de-
gree of unexpectedness and confidence
into a signal is embedded (Friston et al.,
2006), which is supported by the induction
of confidence into visually guided choices
bymicrostimulation in visual areas (Fetsch
et al., 2014). Relatedly, presentation of
visual stimuli associated with high un-
certainty has also been demonstrated to
increase activity in visual areas (Vilares
et al., 2012). This activity could thus reflect
a visual surprise signal factoring into the
decision to update beliefs.
The second normative factor is the un-
certainty associated with the belief in the
current model, which the authors term
relative uncertainty (RU), as irreducible
or expected uncertainty also has to be ac-
counted for. RU is conceptually closely
related to a stimulus’ associability and is
directly related to the uncertainty of the
current estimate (Pearce and Hall 1980)
or, inversely, the number of previous ob-
servations in a predictable environment.
Therefore, RU is high following detected
CPs associated with major belief updates
and decreases when more observations
accumulate. Expectably, high RU was
also related to higher learning rates tying
behavior more closely to the preceding
outcome and disregarding historic ones.
Es
tim
at
ed
 e
ffe
ct
 o
n 
le
ar
ni
ng
 ra
te
 (a
.u.
)
Sc
he
m
at
ic
 u
ni
qu
e 
fM
RI
 c
or
re
la
te
s
Sc
he
m
at
ic
 c
om
m
on
 fM
RI
 c
or
re
la
te
s
1 nTrial number
Change point probability Relative uncertainty Reward value
Normative factors Incidental factors
(a.
u
.)
?
Figure 1. Relationship of Factors Influencing Learning Rates and Their Unique and Common
fMRI Correlates
Bottom: CP probability (red) and RU (blue) both increase learning rates and are derived from a Bayesian
model representing normative factors. CP probability increases quickly around CPs and rapidly decays,
whereas RU shows a slower temporal dynamic. On rewarding trials, an additional learning rate increase
is observed (yellow). Reward is randomly distributed across trials.
Middle: CP covaries uniquely with activity in bilateral visual cortices (left), whereas RU uniquely covaries
with bilateral anterior PFC activity (middle). The reward regressor covaried with bilateral striatal BOLD re-
sponses.
Top: conjunct regions common to all three factors included DMFC, posterior cingulate cortices, parietal
cortices, and bilateral anterior insula. Regions coding normative factors interacted with conjunct regions
relative to their behavioral importance (double-headed arrows), while reward did not show such a clear
effect (dashed arrow).
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PreviewsAnalysis of fMRI correlates of this type
of uncertainty showed unique increased
activation in parietal cortex and bilateral
anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC). A verysimilar pattern was found in a study
showing increased aPFC and parietal
activity with increasing values of alterna-
tive unchosen options (Boorman et al.,Neuron 84, N2011). It will be a matter of future research
to reconcile these results: are increased
values of alternative options generally as-
sociated with higher RU, or does higher
RU intensify the search and tracking of
alternative options?
Other areas were less active when un-
certainty was high. Decreased activity
was found in ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex (vmPFC), which fits nicely to other
studies that report value coding in
vmPFC, as here the expected value of
each trial following change points in-
creases with increasing model precision.
Besides these normative factors, the
analysis also revealed an influence of
reward on the learning rate. Only gold
bags were associated with reward, and
their occurrence was randomized, but
following these rewarding events learning
rates also increased despite carrying no
additional objective information. In the
current task, this is a clear deviation
from optimal behavior. As the authors
point out, future work has to reveal
whether a similar effect is found for pun-
ishing events. It should be noted, how-
ever, that in real life it is difficult to find
rewarding or punishing events that are
completely devoid of additional goal-
related information, suggesting that a
value effect on learning rate is in most
cases adaptive. It could be speculated
that this effect, reflected in bilateral stria-
tal activity, is hardwired, i.e., Pavlovian.
Dynamic Influences on Common
Learning-Rate Regions
However, McGuire et al. (2014) not only
find activity unique for each factor, but
also demonstrate conjunct activity that is
influenced by all three behaviorally rele-
vant factors. Most prominently (but not
restricted to), activity in dorsomedial fron-
tal cortex (DMFC, often also called poste-
rior medial frontal cortex) was positively
associated with all factors influencing
learning rates. This fits well with observa-
tions where DMFC activity covaried with
estimated volatility of the environment
during outcome observation, and the de-
gree of this covariation furthermore posi-
tively correlated with learning rates across
subjects (Behrens et al., 2007). Further-
more, fMRI analysis of dynamic learning-
rate magnitudes derived from a reinfor-
cement learning model revealed a very
similar region in DMFC (Krugel et al.,ovember 19, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 663
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vation that lesions in a part of the DMFC,
the anterior cingulate sulcus, result in def-
icits in modulating learning rate appropri-
ately in a changing environment, thereby
leading to severe impairments in reversal
learning (Kennerley et al., 2006). The cur-
rent study goes beyond the scope of pre-
vious studies by demonstrating very clear
relationships between the activity in this
common region and behavioral adapta-
tion. The authors demonstrate that the
coupling of regions specific for the pro-
bability of change points and RU with
the common regions increases and de-
creases dynamically when each factor ex-
erts more or less influence on learning
rates behaviorally. Furthermore, a stron-
ger reflection of the behavioral variables
in the neural data also correlated with
increased influences of the normative fac-
tors on behavior across subjects. In other
words, the more similar the behavior of an
individual was to the Bayesian model, the
more these variables were reflected in the
neural activity in the common learning-
rate region. Although these fMRI data
cannot elucidate the temporal dynamics
of which region provides information first,
these findings provide compelling evi-
dence that a region within DMFC can
adaptively shift the weight of different
inputs from regions specialized in evalu-
ating different factors to up- and downre-
gulate the impact of external observations
on beliefs about the state of a model. The
pathway through which the value informa-
tion is conveyed to the common region
integrating influences on learning rate is
still a matter of debate (Ullsperger et al.,
2014), and future studies should address
this interaction more directly.
Behavioral Residuals Explain
Additional Neural Data
A very interesting aspect of the relation-
ship between neural processes and be-
havioral adaptation lies within residual
variance. Consider a situation in which a664 Neuron 84, November 19, 2014 ª2014 Ebehavioral model predicts a participant’s
behavior with reliable accuracy. Still, on
some trials, a subject may behave unex-
pectedly, for example by increasing the
belief about the helicopter’s position
more than that predicted by the model.
This additional variance can be used to
identify neural correlates driving individual
decisions that cannot be captured by a
computational model (Fischer and Ull-
sperger 2013). McGuire et al. (2014) im-
plemented the residuals of the behavioral
analysis in the GLM of neural data and
found that (a) to some degree higher ac-
tivity in the common region was associ-
ated with additional behavioral effects
and (b) unique activity in a DMFC region
captured unexplained variance in be-
havior. This was further supported by a
reciprocal analysis: single-trial BOLD esti-
mates explained additional variance in
the behavioral model. The first finding
strengthens the link between behavior
and fMRI activity, and the second finding
hints to other factors that appear to have
effects on learning rates that may not be
captured by this behavioral model or in
principle may be hard to account for.
Although these findings have to be taken
cum grano salis, the identified regions
are compatible with salience coding re-
gions, and activity here may reflect indi-
vidual arousal fluctuating throughout the
task.
In the current study, as in most other
studies on the topic, change points were
manifested as distinct jumps to a new po-
sition. However, for many natural sce-
narios, a gradual change may be more
realistic. For example, when monitoring
climate change, no manifest change point
is likely to be found, but a change must be
detected based on a consistent bias into a
certain direction. Although some studies
indicate that employing different models,
that either assume a uniform distribution
for newpositions or drifts to the new state,
appears to have comparable neural corre-
lates (Behrens et al., 2007), this should belsevier Inc.addressed explicitly. Furthermore, such a
scenario would also enable the study of
how subjects weight not only outcomes,
but also changes in the underlying speed
of drift that could accelerate or decel-
erate, providing even more naturalistic
tasks.
In sum, McGuire et al. (2014) elegantly
demonstrate how different variables
represented in distinct brain regions are
integrated by a common network to
determine the right time to change ones
beliefs by rapidly increasing learning rates
and to adjust behavior accordingly.
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